A general talks about Indian army overkill in 1984

By Asia Samachar | INDIA |

The overkill at Amritsar in 1984 was a deliberate attempt to break the Sikh psyche and win political points with the wider electorate. The army action on Darbar Sahib, popularly known as the Golden Temple, was simply a massive show of force when such a move could have been easily avoided.

A retired senior Indian army officer, who at one point was by-passed for promotion to the top most post, agreed that the army action was both a political blunder and a military botch up.

A few years before the attack, Lt Gen SK Sinha was the commander of the Western Army, India’s most strategic combat India’s most strategic combat force, with Punjab featuring in its footprint. While there, he had anticipated the possibility of the army being called on to enter the historic Sikh institution in Amritsar. Knowing the sensitivity of such a move, he had come up with a written guideline as to what should be done.

“We would do everything in a transparent manner,” he told Kanwar Sandhu in an interview in 2014, two years before the general passed away. The interview is worth revisiting. Click here.

Sinha was no longer in the army when the attack on the Golden Temple took place. He was Vice-Chief of Army Staff when he opted for early retirement in 1983. He went on to serve as Governor of Assam and Jammu & Kashmir and ambassador to Nepal.

Sinha was poised to replace General K V Krishna Rao as the Army chief in 1983. Towards the last lap, however, there was a change of mind in the Indira Gandhi led government, and the job went to General A S Vaidya. It is said that his views on Sikh issues played a role in the decision to deny him the top army post.

The next incident of such a superseding took place 33 years later in 2016 when Lt Gen Bipin Rawat was appointed to the top post, by-passing Lt Gen Praveen Bakshi and Lt Gen PM Hariz, the two most senior officers in the army then.

In the interview, Sinha provides insights into the Panjab troubles that climaxed with the so-called ‘Operation Bluestar’ by the Indian army.

He shared his experience when he was the Western Army Commander, giving him an insight into Punjab’s problems from close quarters.

He narrated how in 1981, his command chief of staff received orders from the Prime Minister to arrest Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale in Mehta Chowk.

“As a good staff officer, he acted on it, thinking that I would also do the same,” he said. However, when Sinha got to know about it, his immediately cancelled the order.

He then rang up Defence Minister R Venkataraman to brief him on his decision and requested that he be allowed to present his views to the PM. The defence minister was taken aback, asking if Sinha would not ‘carry out the Prime Minister’s orders.’

“I said, ‘No, sir, I would carry out the prime minister’s orders. But my submission is that I’m an army commander, I should be allowed to present my views before the prime minister before she goes to decision. After hearing my views, when she gives a decision ‘You should go’, I will go.”

A few hours later, he received a message from the minister that the army can stand down as the task would be carried out by the state.

“It was not disobedience of orders, it was just presenting my views to the Prime Minister,” he quipped, commenting on newspaper headlines the next day stating that the army commander had refused to send troops to Mehta Chowk gurdwara.

The Mehta Chowk village, located 45 kilometres from Amritsar, is the headquarters of the Damdami Taksal, which was then led by Bhindranwale.

Sinha shared how the action on those holed up in the Darbar Sahib could have been done very differently.

Anticipating an attack on Darbar Sahib, Sinha had actually worked out a procedure as to how the army would enter a gurdwara, if the need arose.

They would first cordon off the area and try to talk the men holed up inside to come out peacefully. The operation would be led by Sikh commander and have a good mix of Sikh and non-Sikh troops. They would invite eminent Sikh personalities to see what is actually happening to avoid spread of false news. At the same time, Sinha said he would invite television coverage so that people could see what the army was doing. He wanted to be transparent and open.

He was also cognisant of the downside of storming a gurdwara with tanks. “Use of tanks in a gurdwara will have national and international repercussions which will be very undesirable.” It will also hurt the sentiments of the large number of Sikh soldiers.

If his outlined procedure was followed, Sinha believed it would have reduced the hurt to the Sikh sentiment.

But, alas, it was not to be as the army stormed in guns blazing and even brought in the tanks. An overkill, totally unnecessary. There was a total media blackout which led to confusion, fear and uncertainty.

Asked if it was a political blunder or a military botch up, he said it was both.

“Sunder Ji was a brilliant officer, but he was looking for a field Marshall’s bed. He was all out to please Indira Gandhi. He even ignored the standing operating procedure which I had laid down for it,” he quipped.

He was was referring to Krishnaswamy Sundar who had commanded the Operation Blue Star. In 1986, he was promoted to General and appointed Chief of Army Staff (COAS) after the assassination of General A.S. Vaidya. He retired in May 1988 and died in 1999, a year after he was diagnosed with motor neuron disease.

RELATED STORY:

Can Sikhs Forget June 1984? (Asia Samachar, 11 June 2020)