By Gurnam Singh | Opinion |
Introduction
Forty years after the Sarbat Khalsa gathering of 26 January 1986, the idea of Khalistan continues to evoke contested memories, political anxieties and unresolved questions about justice, sovereignty and the future of the Sikh community in India. While much diminished in force, the idea of Khalistan still occupies a space within the Sikh psyche. Therefore, any meaningful evaluation of the Khalistan movement must do two things: understand its deep historical roots and analyse the contemporary realities that shape Sikh political consciousness today. This article traces these historical foundations, examines the rupture of the 1980s that gave rise to the modern demand for Khalistan, and critically evaluates why support for the project has declined.
The roots of Sikh sovereignty.
One of the challenges in tracing the origins of the Khalistan idea is the sheer range of historical reference points invoked by its proponents. Some identify its beginnings with Guru Nanak, whose mission is described by the Sikh scholar Bhai Gurdas as the establishment of a new, spiritually grounded community: “ਮਾਰਿਆ ਸਿਕਾ ਜਗਤਿ ਵਿਚਿ ਨਾਨਕ ਨਿਰਮਲ ਪੰਥੁ ਚਲਾਇਆ।” (He established the authority of his doctrine in the world and created a pure path.)
This idea of Panth, as a community bound by shared ethics, values and institutions, has often been interpreted by Khalistani ideologues as the earliest seed of a distinct Sikh nationhood. Subsequent historical developments reinforced this notion. The formation of the Guru Granth Sahib by Guru Arjan is sometimes framed as the articulation of a constitutional and ethical order for an envisioned Sikh society. This interpretation, whether or not universally accepted, highlights an important point: Sikh scripture has been invoked not only for spiritual guidance but also as a template for social and political organisation.
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A major turning point occurs with the establishment of the Akal Takht by Guru Hargobind in 1606. As the highest seat of Sikh temporal authority, located opposite the Darbar Sahib, it symbolised an assertion of Sikh political agency. Guru Hargobind’s issuing of edicts (hukamnamas), maintenance of the Akal Sena, and leadership in military campaigns marked a decisive shift from purely spiritual community to a sovereign, self-governing collective.
The Khalsa Panth and the Idea of a Distinct Quom/Nation.
The creation of the Khalsa by Guru Gobind Singh in 1699 further crystallised this transformation. Described as a “commonwealth of saint-soldiers,” the Khalsa Panth embodied both spiritual discipline and temporal responsibility. Texts such as the Rahitnamas began referring to the Sikhs as a distinct quom, namely, a nation defined by ethical commitments rather than ethnicity or territory.
This evolving political identity took concrete institutional shape under Banda Singh Bahadur (1709–1716). In a short but impactful period, Banda dismantled Mughal administrative structures and established an autonomous Sikh polity centred at Lohgarh. His reforms, such as abolishing the feudal zamindari system, were radical for their time. By minting coins and issuing seals in the name of the Gurus rather than himself, he reinforced the concept of collective, Guru-centred sovereignty rather than personal rule.
The 18th and 19th Century: From Misls to the Sikh Empire
By the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the Sikh Misls (confederacies) consolidated power across Punjab and beyond, culminating in the Sikh Empire under Maharaja Ranjit Singh. The continued minting of coins in the Gurus’ name was a formal statement of political legitimacy rooted in Sikh tradition. For many modern advocates of Khalistan, this era represents the clearest precedent of Sikh nationhood expressed in territorial, administrative and military form.
The Sikh Misls and the empire of Maharaja Ranjit Singh represented significant Sikh political power. However, interpreting them as a clear precedent for modern Sikh nationhood is historically problematic. Ranjit Singh’s unification was dynastic and imperial, not an expression of popular Sikh sovereignty. Moreover, the Sikh Empire was deliberately pluralistic in composition and governance. It ruled over a majority non-Sikh population, employed Muslims, Hindus and Europeans in senior roles, retained Persian administration, and preserved existing legal and revenue systems. Projecting contemporary Khalistani ideology onto this period imposes modern nationalist concepts onto an early modern empire. While the era marks an important chapter of Sikh political ascendancy, it does not constitute a direct historical mandate for a modern Sikh nation-state.
Post-Colonial India and the Partition of Punjab
Against the backdrop of the anti-colonial Indian independence movement during the first half of the 20th Century, calls for some kind of Sikh homeland did emerge. During the 1920s–40s, many Sikh leaders feared political marginalisation in a future independent India dominated demographically by Hindus and Muslims. In response, some articulated demands for constitutional safeguards, provincial autonomy, or a “Sikh state” within a federal India rather than full independence. Notably, the Akali leadership and figures like Master Tara Singh called for a Sikh-majority province where Sikhs could protect their religious, political, and economic interests. A few fringe voices floated the idea of an independent Sikh state, but this was not the dominant or widely organised demand at the time.
These aspirations were overtaken by the realities of Partition in 1947. Punjab was divided between India and Pakistan, splitting Sikh population centres and holy sites and triggering immense violence and displacement. Sikh leaders ultimately aligned with India, partly due to assurances from Congress leaders about minority protections, assurances that many Sikhs later felt were inadequately fulfilled. The failure to secure a distinct Sikh political unit at independence meant that Sikh homeland demands were deferred rather than resolved, resurfacing decades later in new forms, most notably in the post-1960s Punjabi Suba movement and, later, Khalistan advocacy.
The Traumatic 1980’s and the call for Khalistan
Within growing frustration regarding their treatment within India and most significantly the failure of the Indian Sate under Clause 25 of the Constitution to recognise Sikhs as a separate people, demands for an aggressive Sikh sovereignty emerged during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s with violent and painful ramifications.
The Dharam Yudh Morcha, was launched in 1982 by the Sikh Nationalist Party, The Shiromani Akali Dal, in collaboration with Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and other groups, most notably the All-India Sikh Students Federation led by Bhai Amrik Singh. This represented a mass civil-disobedience movement aimed at pressuring the Indian government to address long-standing Sikh political, religious, and economic grievances articulated in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. Adopted in 1973, the Resolution called for a highly decentralised federal structure that would grant greater autonomy to states, therefore safeguarding Sikh religious identity in a self-governing Sikh majority state of Punjab. There were also demands to ensure fair distribution of river waters, and to protect Punjabi language and culture.
Though stopping short of demanding outright secession, the Indian state took the view that the Anandpur Resolution was a threat to the integrity of the nation and therefore refused to concede any of the substantive demands. During the Morcha, tens of thousands of Sikhs courted arrest through non-violent protest, but the movement unfolded amid escalating polarisation, state repression, and the growing prominence of militant rhetoric.
The deadlock between the Akali’s and New Delhi, combined with the breakdown of trust and governance in Punjab, set the stage for the militarisation of the conflict and the dramatic events of 1984, marking a decisive rupture in Sikh relations with the Indian State. What many historians have recorded as a profound trauma, beginning with Operation Blue Star and the military assault on the seat of Sikh sovereignty, the Darbar Sahib complex, widespread state repression, human rights violations, disappearances and custodial killings became normalised in Panjab. For many Sikhs, these events constituted an irreparable rupture in the relationship between Punjab and the Indian state compared to the Jallianwala massacre in 1919, and the subsequent collapse of British rule in India.
If matters could not get any worse, following the assassination of the then PM of India, Indira Gandhi in Oct 1984 and the subsequent genocide of Sikhs in Delhi and other parts of India, calls for Khalistan were strengthened, reaching beyond the confines of the Punjab State but across India. It was within this context that the modern demand for Khalistan acquired political meaning. The idea was not born out of abstract ideology but from lived experience of injustice, genocide and, from the Sikh perspective, the collapse of democratic norms.
The 1986 Sarbat Khalsa and the Declaration of Khalistan
On 26 January 1986, more than 100,000 Sikhs gathered at the Akal Takht to the future of the Panth. The assembly passed a series of significant gurmatas (resolutions):
• the demolition and rebuilding of the state-reconstructed Akal Takht;
• the excommunication of Sikh leaders who had supported the Rajiv–Longowal Accord;
• the dissolution of the SGPC, replaced by a Panthic Committee;
• the appointment of Bhai Jasbir Singh Rode as Jathedar.
These resolutions culminated in the written Declaration of Khalistan on 29 April 1986, announced from the Akal Takht and naming the Khalistan Commando Force as its official army. For many, this was a moment of collective resistance and a symbolic reclaiming of dignity after the traumatic events of 1984. However, By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the general population in Punjab became increasingly disillusioned with the movement resulting in support for the cause significantly diminishing.
Why Support for Khalistan Declined
If we fast forward 40 years, while the grievances that fuelled the movement remain real, several factors have contributed to the decline of broad-based support.
First, one needs to acknowledge that history shows that most political movements tend to reach a peak and then enter into a downward spiral. The insurgency dragged on with some militant groups turned to extortion and worse, which clearly alienated the very peasantry and middle class that the movement claimed to represent. Coupled with this was also a profound “peace fatigue.” It is clear that the Khalistan movement lost much of its popular support amongst the Sikh masses, many of whom were more concerned with mundane matters than nation building.
Second, there has been an abject failure by the advocates of Khalistan to consistently and clearly articulate the political ideology and governance structures, especially the position of women and minorities, resulting in confusion and mistrust amongst Sikhs. Clearly, some of this confusion is as a result of the Indian State and its own propaganda machine, as well as restricting advocates for Khalistan to present their case to the population.
Third, linked to the growing sense of mistrust, a recurring concern, especially amongst secular liberal minded Sikhs is the association of Khalistani discourse with theocratic tendencies, namely, rule by clerics, self-appointed Jathebandhis or religious elites. This for many contradicts both Sikh philosophy, which rejects priestly monopoly, and modern democratic principles. The failure of advocates of Khalistan to clearly address these concerns has resulted in many fearing that Khalistan would be no different to Hindutva India or Islamic Pakistan.
Fourth, one must not discount the Indian States determined effort to crush the insurgency through massive security operations and engaging in extra judicial killings. Under the leadership of Punjab Police Chief K.P.S. Gill and Punjab CM Beant Singh, the state used aggressive counter-insurgency tactics, such as infiltrating militant ranks, bribing key individuals, and creating internal distrust, which lead to the collapse of operational networks and on a large scale.
Fifth, numerous groups (e.g., Babbar Khalsa, Khalistan Commando Force, Bhindranwale Tiger Force) often operated independently and sometimes clashed with one another over ideological differences or territorial control. This resulted in something of a rudderless movement, especially after many of the key militant leaders had been eliminated by the Indian state. In contrast to the period where Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale was widely recognised as the leader of the struggle, the movement lacked a single, charismatic leader who could not only unify the various factions and but also provide a clear political roadmap. This meant it was only a matter of time for those cracks to open up.
As we can see today, both in Panjab and across the global Sikh diaspora, Sikhs are hopelessly divided and there is no doubt this has seriously damaged the Khalistan movement. Nowadays, the remaining factions advocating for Khalistan are more preoccupied with criticising each other than in focussing their energy on the more difficult task of making the cause of Sikhs sovereignty relevant to a totally new generation of Sikhs, many of whom were not born in 1984 and/or have little awareness of that critical period of Sikh history.
Conclusion
The idea of Khalistan is rooted in a long and rich history of Sikh moral, political and spiritual sovereignty. Its modern revival in the 1980s emerged from genuine experiences of injustice and political rupture. But the excesses of the Indian State coupled with serious internal differences amongst Sikh groups and a lack of clarity about the nature of the envisaged independent state of Khalistan has resulted in a cause that is seriously weakened.
Forty years after the 1986 Sarbat Khalsa, the challenge for all Sikhs remains the same: to imagine a future that honours Sikh history and traditions, while avoiding the dangers of religious fanaticism. Ultimately, if the idea of Khalistan is to have a future, its advocates must convince not only the Sikhs of Punjab but non-Sikhs that establishing such a nation offers them a better future than the one they are living within the Indian Constitutional structure. Though these do matter, this is likely to be a much greater project than the present strategy of holding rallies and/or engaging in vocal street protests, which if anything is simply further undermining the cause.
Gurnam Singh is an academic activist dedicated to human rights, liberty, equality, social and environmental justice. He is a Professor of Sociology at University of Warwick, UK. He can be contacted at Gurnam.singh.1@warwick.ac.uk
* This is the opinion of the writer and does not necessarily represent the views of Asia Samachar.
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